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ABSTRACT Network neutrality is the principle of treating equally all Internet traffic regardless of its
source, destination, content, application or other related distinguishing metrics. Under net neutrality, Internet
service providers (ISPs) are compelled to charge all content providers (CPs) the same per Gbps rate despite
the growing profit achieved by CPs. In this paper, we study the impact of the repeal of net neutrality on
communication networks by developing a techno-economic Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
model to maximize the potential profit ISPs can achieve by offering their services to CPs. We consider
an ISP that offers CPs different classes of service representing typical video content qualities. The MILP
model maximizes the ISP profit by optimizing the prices of the different classes according to the users’
demand sensitivity to the change in price, referred to as Price Elasticity of Demand (PED). We analyze how
PED impacts the profit in different CP delivery scenarios in cloud-fog architectures. The results show that
the repeal of net neutrality can potentially increase ISPs profit by a factor of 8 with a pricing scheme that
discriminates against data intensive content. Also, the repeal of net neutrality positively impacts the network
energy efficiency by reducing the core network power consumption by 55% as a result of suppressing data
intensive content compared to the net neutrality scenario.
INDEX TERMS Net neutrality, AT&T, IP over WDM networks, profit, power consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network (net) neutrality regulations prohibit Internet service
providers (ISPs) from applying different treatment to
IP packets based on their content e.g. prioritizing, blocking or
throttling certain Internet content or allowing quality differ-
entiation. Net neutrality, which was scrapped by the US Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) in December 2017,
has been the subject of remarkable debate in recent years
between ISPs and content providers (CPs) with each side
trying to exploit their assets and expand their profit and influ-
ence. The debate is fueled by the rapidly escalating demand
for CPs services as a result of the interconnection between
Internet and broadcasting markets. Cisco forecasts [1] that
by 2021, annual global Internet traffic will hit 2.2 Zettabytes
per month and CPs datacenters will be the source of 71% of
this traffic. Online video services are the primary cause of
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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this accelerated growth in Internet traffic. Video streaming
is poised to consume 78% of the total CPs bandwidth with
75% of Internet video traffic originating from higher video
services quality (High definition (HD) andUltra-HD (UHD)).
Proponents of preferential treatment of Internet traffic
complain that the increasing demand for data-intensive con-
tent creates a significant burden on the communication net-
work. They argue that removing net neutrality will give ISPs
further control of their infrastructure, which is crucial in
order to improve QoS and reduce security threats. Another
argument is that a significant fraction of the profit of this
tremendously growing market is seized by CPs whereas ISPs
act as a transit or transport medium into CPs customers. In the
US, the quarterly profit margin of AT&T (an ISP) has been
almost stable over the last six years whereas Netflix (a CP)
profit margin has risen up in rapid pace from 0.7% to 9.8%
within the same period [2], [3]. In contrast, advocates warn
that removing net neutrality will slow down the innovation
in the Internet and its content and will limit the content
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FIGURE 1. Main stakeholders in Internet ecosystem. Arrows represent customer-provider relationship.
competition by disadvantaging small businesses, and subse-
quently, diminish online services.
Deploying traffic discrimination in video delivery services
has many challenges, e.g. detecting video packets and enforc-
ing a policy on a certain video quality. Traffic discrimination
in IP communication networks has been surveyed intensively
in the literature. Several traffic management practices have
been surveyed in [4]. The authors highlighted that traffic
discrimination taxonomy has four features: (i) characteristics
or condition of the traffic (e.g. based on content, protocol or
source/destination). Real-time Transmission Protocol (RTP)
is the Internet-standard protocol for the transport of real-time
data. To identify the video content type (e.g. UHD, HD etc)
transported over the network, the payload type in the RTP
header can be inspected [5]. (ii) traffic classification (e.g.
based on flow rate or header information). (iii) mechanism
of discrimination (e.g. modify, delay, drop or block); and
i(iv) perceived discrimination by end-users. To maximize
QoE of providing video streaming service, traditional CPs
typically use HTTP-based adaptive bitrate video streaming
algorithms to provide video streaming over the Internet.
Video is encoded at different bitrates with different video
qualities at the CP’s server to dynamically adjust the video
bitrate (e.g. based on available network bandwidth) and such
content is cached [6], [7]. Video traffic can be analyzed
using two mechanisms; deep packet inspection (DPI) [8] or
traffic profiling [9]. DPI examines the data packets that are
sent over the network and traffic profiling detects abnormal
network traffic by comparing new traffic against previous
traffic profile. For example, an alarm can be triggered if
the data rate transmitted over the network (measured in bps)
spikes above the desired data rate, which could indicate an
increase in data rate. QoS for video services delivery can
be applied either by reserving network bandwidth for video
packets (e.g. using IntServ) or labelling video content as high
priority e.g. by applying Differentiated Services (e.g. using
DiffServ) [10].
The Internet ecosystem is complex with many stakehold-
ers. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the main stakeholders in the
Internet ecosystem are: ISPs, CPs, content delivery net-
works (CDNs) and end-users. Users pay ISPs a subscription
fee to get Internet access and subscribe to CPs (if required)
to access their content. CPs subscribe to a CDN to access
storage and processing capacity and to deliver their content
to customers. CDNs are responsible for sending CPs content
at large scale over ISPs network infrastructure, e.g. the CP
Netflix collaborates with the CDN Amazon Web Services
(AWS) to reach their customers [11]. ISPs play as the key
intermediary in the delivery process as they provide the
required connectivity between users and content. Most ISPs
such as AT&T [12] and Comcast [13] are now providing
CDN services in additional to networking services. To sim-
plify our analysis, we consider a direct relationship between
ISP and CPs.
Due to net neutrality regulations, current pricing policy of
ISP networking services applies a fixed charge which is not
linked with bitrate usage. For example, in the US, AT&T uses
a fixed pricing model by charging CPs $3,282 per 10 Gbps
per month [14] regardless of the content type transferred to
users (either UHD video content or a simple text message).
In this paper, we provide a novel techno-economic Mixed
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model built to study
the potential profit an ISP can achieve by a differentiated
pricing scheme under the repeal of net neutrality. The model
optimizes the pricing scheme of differentiated service classes
tomaximize the ISP profit based on price elasticity of demand
(PED). The MILP model finds the resulting equilibrium
pricing, core network power consumption and traffic. To the
best of our knowledge, this techno-economic MILP model is
the first that studies the potential profit an ISP can achieve by
proposing differentiated service classes to deliver CPs content
of different data rate requirements at a varying price per bit
rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
briefly summarizes related work. We describe the pricing
scheme we used in this paper and the profit-driven model
we adopted in Section III. Our results are presented in
Section IV. In Section V, we provide concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORKS
Many papers in the literature discussed and analyzed various
aspects of net neutrality. From a legalization and regulation
perspective, net neutrality in the Internet ecosystem has been
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surveyed by the authors in [15]. They emphasized that cloud
computing has initiated the net neutrality battle between ISPs
and CPs. In [16] the authors analyzed the Internet video
streaming contest, taking into account all of ISPs and CPs
assets (e.g. content rights, network access, users, . . . etc). They
stated that video distribution makes the dilemmas of net neu-
trality solid and perceptible. Their analysis demonstrates that
net neutrality correlates highly with video service delivery
at different points including competition between CPs and
ISPs, competition between stand-alone CP and CP owned by
ISPs in providing video delivery services and growth of video
traffic.
A number of papers in the literature focus on providing
mathematical models to investigate the influence of the repeal
of net neutrality on communication networks. Paid service
differentiation where CPs voluntarily pay a monopoly ISP for
prioritizing their traffic under shared network infrastructure
was investigated by the authors in [17]. The differentiation
occurs where ISPs offer service classes for CPs to choose
from where traffic of a higher-priority class will be processed
before those of a lower-priority. They studied the optimal
pricing based on either maximizing the CPs’ choices of
service classes or minimizing system delays. Consequently,
they highlighted that ISPs optimal pricing strategy can result
in an efficient differentiation among CPs maximizing social
welfare. Also, they found that applying paid prioritization
can lead to money flows (profit) from CPs to ISPs. The
authors in [10] modelled the competition of video services
delivery market between an ISP’s own integrated CP and
stand-alone CP. They studied the impact of applying different
QoS (marking video traffic as high priority) pricing strategies
either by sellingQoS to CPs, sellingQoS to users, or choosing
to not provide QoS at all. They investigated the impact of QoS
pricing on the video service prices and CPs profit. The anal-
ysis showed that ISPs can sell QoS to CPs at a higher price
than when QoS is sold to users, and the CPs are able to make
more profit when QoS is directly sold to users than the case
when QoS is sold to CPs. Also, they found that an ISP is more
likely to use QoS exclusively for its own video services when
it provides a similar content of CPs. The cloud infrastructure
needed to host and deliver the video content was optimized
in [18]–[21] and the impact of the delivery of large data vol-
umes on the network was evaluated in [22]–[25]. Particular
attention was paid to the core network which forms the heart
of the ISP infrastructure and hosts the CDN with attention
given to the network energy efficiency, latency and other
QoS [26]–[28]. The work in [29] considered the impact of
maximizing profit of CDN providers considering users who
access CPs content from either cloud or fog server. In the case
of competitive CPs, the CDN always places the content of the
popular CP in fog servers, even when a less popular CP pays
more, as the CDN tries to reduce core network transit cost.
The problem of optimizing pricing in competitive envi-
ronments by considering a user-centric approach with
usage-based pricing policies has been studied in the literature.
In [30], the authors introduced power control via a pricing
algorithm in wireless networks for the efficient management
of network resources using a game theory framework. The
framework achieved improvements in QoS compared to the
case with no pricing. In [31], the authors addressed the prob-
lem of efficient utility-based power control in the uplink of a
wireless network via convex pricing. A game theory frame-
work was employed to obtain an efficient power allocation in
the uplink of CDMA networks. The results showed improve-
ment in the quality of experience (QoE) and reduction in the
power consumption compared to linear pricing.
In this paper, a techno-economic Mixed Integer Linear
Programming (MILP) model is developed to maximize the
ISP profit by optimizing the ISP pricing scheme to charge dif-
ferent classes of service differently subject to PED. We con-
sidered three classes of service that represent different
data rate requirements of video content. We build on our
MILP optimization, network, cloud and fog modelling back-
ground [32]–[35] and consider ISPs that offer the CP service
classes, which represent different data rate requirements.
III. REPEALING NET NEUTRALITY
In this paper, we consider the economic concept of PED to
study the impact of ISP’s price change on the number of
users accessing CPs content. In the following subsections,
we present the pricing scheme used in this work followed by
the developed network and pricing MILP model.
A. PRICING SCHEME
In economics, the relationship between users demand and
price is referred to as price elasticity of demand (PED) [36].
PED measures the percentage change in demand resulting
from one percent change in price. To decide pricing strategy
of a product, the seller looks at different sensitivities to vari-
ous factors that may affect their decision to purchase a prod-
uct. The dominant factor in determining PED is the users’
ability and willingness at any given price. Many factors have
an effect on users’ behavior such as substitution availability,
market competition, frequency of purchase, necessity of the
product, and how much the product price represents in users’
income. The PED is calculated as follows:
PED = % Change in Demand
% Change in Price
(1)
In telecommunications, it is not an easy task to estimate
an exact value of PED for various Internet applications as the
factors that affect the elasticity change from area to another
e.g. wealth, popularity of an application, quality of service
provided by ISPs/CPs or competition between different CPs.
However, PED for broadband subscriptions in Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries has been analyzed in [41] by studying the relationship
between price, income and broadband adoption. Additional
factors have been included in [42], which are age and edu-
cation to study PED for broadband subscriptions in Latin
America and the Caribbean countries. They found that 1%
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decrease in price would lead to 0.43% and 2.2% increase in
demand, respectively, over the two selected areas.
B. PROFIT-DRIVEN MILP MODEL
Mathematical representation is the most concise and accurate
representation of a problem and can help understand and
solve the problem in hand. The problem considered is linear
in nature, with a large number of variables. This lends itself
to mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimization
which has been used intensively in the literature to solve net-
work design problem such as maximizing the profit achieved
by infrastructure providers [39] and minimizing the power
consumption of delivering clouds services [40].
We develop a profit-driven MILP model where the objec-
tive is to maximize the total profit of an ISP offering core
network infrastructure to CPs to deliver content from dis-
tributed clouds and/or fog nodes to their users. This paper
considers a single ISP provider, a monopoly, which exists in
many countries. This may exist directly, i.e. there is one ISP in
the country, or there is one ISP only which is able to provide
full coverage of the country. According to FCC data, 40% of
total US Internet subscribers, around 177million people, only
have a single ISP option in their area [41].
Under the net neutrality repeal, the ISP can deliver CPs
content of different data rate requirements at a varying price
per bit rate. We consider three classes to represent different
data rate requirements of CPs services:
• Class A for high data rate content (i.e. UHD video
service).
• Class B for medium data rate content (i.e. HD video
service).
• Class C for low data rate content (i.e. SD video service).
Note that other types of services (e.g. emails, images,
audio etc.) can be categorized as Class C as they usually
require low download rates.
The ISP needs to optimize the price of the three classes to
maximize its profit. We consider content with higher data
rate, which causes extra burden on the core network, to be
priced higher per bit rate than content with a lower data rate.
End-users will perceive varied video definitions from CPs
based on their CP subscribed class. We assume that CPs will
transfer the ISP new prices to their users to maintain their
profit margin. Therefore, the CPs offer the same classes to
their users. The proposed model maximizes the ISP profit
which is a function of the price per bit rate of each class and
the number of users per class which are related by (1), e.g. 1%
increase in price, under PED= 1, would lead to 1% decrease
in the number of users. The model selects the price per class
that results in the maximum profit for the ISP at a given PED.
We assume a certain number of users to initially sub-
scribe to each class under net neutrality. As the ISP and
consequently the CPs vary the per bit rate charges for the
different classes, users can choose to upgrade, downgrade or
unsubscribe to the service. The number of users subscribing
to each class depends on the PED. We assume that users
leaving class A will join class B, users leaving class B will
join class C and users leaving class C will unsubscribe to
the service. Note that the proposed framework ensures that
we can deliver different classes without blocking and with-
out time constraints. Also, the proposed model can support
mechanisms, similar to Call Admission Control (CAC) [42]
by applying constraints on data intensive applications. Here,
the network is driven into a state where it does not carry large
traffic volumes of a certain class. In generic terms however,
CAC is used to optimize the allocation of available resources
of IP multimedia traffic to either guarantee QoS or ensure the
best utilization of resources.
Before introducing the model, we define the parameters
and variables used in the model:
1) PARAMETERS
s and d Indices of source and destination nodes of a
traffic demand.
m and n Indices of the end nodes of a physical link.
i and j Indices of the end nodes of a virtual link.
N Set of IP over WDM network nodes.
Nmm Set of neighbouring nodes of node m.
α Set of service classes.
W Number of wavelengths per fibre.
B Wavelength data rate.
CN Number of clouds hosted in core network.
u Total number of users in net neutrality scenario
(i.e. before net neutrality is repealed).
LB Minimum percentage of users served by CP to
be maintained by the pricing scheme.
di Download rate of class i.
C· The cost in US$ of provisioning a Gbps of IP
over WDM network bandwidth per month.
C
· The cost in US$ of provisioning a Gbps of
metro and access network bandwidth
per month.
PS The net neutrality selling price in US$ of a
Gbps of network bandwidth per month.
Ei Price elasticity of demand of class i.
Nd,i Number of users of class i located in node d
under net neutrality scenario.
δs δs = 1, if a cloud datacentre is hosted in node s,
otherwise δs = 0.
Fd Fd = 1, if there is no fog datacentre hosted in
node d, otherwise Fd = 0.
S Set of all possible solutions.
ρs,i The price of class i under solution s and class i.
yns,d,i The number of users in solution s subscribing
to class i in node d as a result of its PED,
where PS
ρs,i−PS Ei =
∑
d∈N
(
yns,d,i−Nd,i
Nd,i
)
∀i ∈ α, s ∈ S.
2) VARIABLES
Ci,j Number of wavelengths in virtual link (i, j).
Wm,n Number of wavelengths in physical link (m, n).
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APCs Number of router ports in node s that aggregate
the traffic from clouds.
Fmn Number of fibres on physical link (m, n).
Ls,di,j Amount of traffic flow between node pair (s, d)
traversing virtual link (i, j) .
W i,jm,n Number of wavelengths of virtual link (i, j)
traversing physical link (m, n).
ri ISP’s revenue achieved by delivering traffic of
class i to CP users.
R Total ISP’s revenue in US$ of delivering
networking services to CPs content.
C Total ISP cost in US$ of provisioning
core network.
Pi The price in US$ per Gbps of network bandwidth
per month charged to the class i.
Ud,i Number of users who subscribe to class i located
in node d .
CDi,d Cloud flow from users in node d subscribed
to class i.
Zs,i Zs,i = 1, if solution s is selected for class i,
otherwise Zs,i = 0.
yss,d,i The number of users in solution s subscribing
to class i in node dyss,d,i > 0 if solution s is
selected for class i, otherwise yss,d,i = 0.
Total ISP’s cost and revenue of delivering CP contents are
calculated as follows:
Cost of provisioning core, metro and access networks
infrastructure (C):∑
s∈N
APCs B C· +
∑
i∈α
∑
d∈N
Ud,i
C
· di (2)
Revenue of delivering networking services to CP users (R):∑
i∈α
ri (3)
The model is defined as follows:
The objective:
Maximize total profit given as:∑
i∈α
ri −
(∑
s∈N
APCs B C· +
∑
i∈α
∑
d∈N
Ud,i
C
· di
)
(4)
Equation (4) gives the total profit in US dollar.
The total profit is maximized by maximizing the revenue
and minimizing the cost of serving users in different classes.
Subject to:
Revenue of each class:
ri =
∑
d∈N
Ud,i di Pi ∀i ∈ α (5)
Constraint (5) calculates the revenue the ISP achieves by
delivering a service class by considering the class price and
the total traffic in each class. Note that, the total revenue is
obtained by multiplying two variables (Ud,i and Pi) which
is a non-linear process. A look up table of solutions under
different PED values defined by parameters ρsi, yss,d,i, yns,d,i
is used for linearization. Constraints (6) - (10) select the opti-
mum number of users and price for each class and calculate
the resulting revenue.
yss,d,i

= (yns,d,iZs,i) if i = 1
≤ (yns,d,i + Nd,1)Zs,i if i = 2
≤ (yns,d,i + Nd,2)Zs,i if i = 3
∀i ∈ α, s ∈ S, d ∈ N (6)
Pi =
∑
s∈ S
(
ρs,iZs,i
) ∀i ∈ α (7)
∑
s∈ S
Zs,i = 1 ∀i ∈ α (8)
Ud,i =
∑
s∈ S
yss,d,i ∀d ∈ N , i ∈ α (9)
ri =
∑
s∈ S
(∑
d∈N
yss,d,i di ρs,i
)
∀i ∈ α (10)
Constraint (6) calculates the number of users in solution s
subscribing to class i in node d , yss,d,i > 0 if solution s
is selected for class i, otherwise yss,d,i = 0. Zs,i = 1, if
solution s is selected for class i, otherwise Zs,i = 0. The
number of users in class A is the number of users subscribing
to the class as a result of its PED (from a look up table).
In the case of class B, the number of users available to
class B includes all users subscribing to the class B as a result
of its PED plus any users downgrading their subscription
from class A to class B. In the case of class C, the number
of users available to class C includes users subscribing to
class C as a result of its PED plus any users downgrading their
subscription from class B to class C. Constraint (7) gives the
price of each class based on the solution selected from the
lookup table. Constraint (8) ensures that only one solution
is selected. Constraint (9) calculates the number of users of
class i in node d . Constraint (10) calculates the revenue the
ISP achieves by delivering a service class by multiplying the
class price by the total traffic in each class.
Constraints on number of users and prices:∑
d∈N
∑
i∈α
Ud,i ≥ u LB (11)
P1 ≥ P2 ≥ P3 (12)∑
d∈N Ud,i∑
d∈N
∑
i∈α Ud,i
= Ud,i∑
i∈α Ud,i
∀i ∈ α, d ∈ N (13)
Constraint (11) defines the minimum user percentage the
CP service needs to maintain. Constraint (12) ensures that
the price of a lower class does not exceed the price of upper
classes, i.e. the price of class C does not exceed the price of
class B and the price of class B does not exceed the price
of class A. Constraint (13) ensures that the ratio of users in
different nodes is identical.
Core network traffic:
CDd,i = Ud,i Fd di ∀ d ∈ N , i ∈ α (14)∑
s∈N
Ls,d =
∑
i∈α
CDd,i ∀ d ∈ N (15)
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Constraint (14) ensures that nodes with a fog built in their
proximity are not served by a cloud. Constraint (15) calcu-
lates the download traffic from CP cloud to users in different
nodes.
User demands can be used to decide on datacenter loca-
tions as follows:
L
∑
d∈N
Ls,d ≥ δs ∀s ∈ N (16)∑
d∈N
Ls,d ≤ L δs ∀s ∈ N (17)
Constraints (16) and (17) relate the binary parameter that
indicates whether there is a datacentre built in node s or
not (δs) to the traffic between users in node d and datacentre
in node s.
Traffic flow conservation constraint in the IP layer:
∑
j∈N :i 6=j
Ls,di,j −
∑
j∈N :i 6=j
Ls,di,j =

Ls,d i = s
−Ls,d i = d
0 otherwise
∀s, d, i ∈ N : s 6= d (18)
Constraint (18) represents the flow conservation for IP
layer in the IP over WDM network. It ensures that the total
incoming traffic equal the total outgoing traffic in all nodes;
excluding the source and destination nodes.
Virtual link capacity constraint:∑
s∈N
∑
d∈N :s6=d
Ls,di,j ≤ Ci,j B ∀i, j ∈ N : s 6= d (19)
Constraint (19) ensures that the traffic transmitted through
a virtual link does not exceed its maximum capacity.
Flow conservation constraint in the optical layer:
∑
n∈Nmm
W i,jm,n −
∑
n∈Nmm
W i,jm,n =

Ci,j m = i
−Ci,j m = j
0 otherwise
∀i, j,m ∈ N : i 6= j (20)
Constraint (20) represents the flow conservation for the
optical layer. It ensures that the total number of incoming
wavelengths in a virtual link is equal to the total number of
outgoing wavelengths in all nodes excluding the source and
destination nodes of the virtual link.
Physical link capacity:∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N :i 6=j
W i,jm,n ≤ WFm,n ∀m, n ∈ N (21)
Constraint (22) represents the physical link capacity limit.
It ensures that the number of wavelengths in virtual links
traversing a physical link does not exceed the maximum
capacity of fibres in the physical link.
Total number of aggregation ports in a core node:
APCs = 1B
∑
d∈N
Ls,d ∀s ∈ N (22)
Constraint (22) calculates the total number of router ports
in each core node that aggregate the traffic from/to the clouds.
The mathematical model given above maximizes the total
profit of an ISP. To calculate the core network power con-
sumption achieved from the profit- driven model, the follow-
ing parameters and variables are introduced;
3) PARAMETERS
S Maximum span distance between two erbium
doped fibre amplifiers (EDFAs).
Dm,n Distance in kilometres between node pair (m, n).
Am,n Number of EDFAs between node pair (m, n) .
Am,n =
⌊
Dm,n
S −1
⌋
where S is the reach of
the EDFA.
Gm,n Number of regenerators between node pair (m, n) .
Typically Gm,n =
⌊
Dm,n
R − 1
⌋
, where R is the
reach of the regenerator.
Prp Router port power consumption.
Pt Transponder power consumption.
Pe EDFA power consumption.
Pos Optical switch power consumption in node s.
Prg Regenerator power consumption.
n Core network power usage effectiveness.
Under the non-bypass approach [44], the IP over WDM
network power consumption is composed of:
The power consumption of routers ports:
n
∑
s∈N
Prp APCs +
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈Nmm:n 6=m
Prp Wm,n
 (23)
The power consumption of transponders:
n
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈Nmm:n 6=m
Pt Wm,n
 (24)
The power consumption of EDFAs:
n
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈Nmm:n 6=m
Pe Fm,nAm,n
 (25)
The power consumption of optical switches:
n
(∑
s∈N
Pos
)
(26)
The power consumption of regenerators:
n
∑
m∈N
∑
n∈Nmm:n 6=m
Prg RGm,n Wm,n
 (27)
The total traffic carried over the core physical links is given
as: ∑
m∈N
∑
n∈Nmm:n6=m
Wm,n B (28)
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TABLE 1. Input parameters of profit-driven model.
In terms of computational complexity, we do not need to
run the model in real-time as the optimization of pricing
is an offline problem solved at the service planning and
service update phases. However, it is important to ensure
that we can obtain solutions for networks with large number
of nodes. The above MILP optimization model has a total
of O(N 4) variables and O(N 3) constraints where N is the
number of nodes. For a network of N = 25, there is a total of
about 254 variables and 253 constraints. Using a 2.5GHz Intel
core i7 with 16 GB memory, the model runs for a maximum
of 7 minutes to obtain the optimum pricing for each price
elasticity of demand (PED) scenario.
IV. PROFIT-DRIVEN MODEL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the increase in ISP profit and
the reduction in network traffic and subsequently power con-
sumption resulting from the optimized pricing scheme under
the repeal of net neutrality. We define the three services
classes as follows;
• Class A; for UHD video service; 18 Mbps download
rate.
• Class B; for HD video service; 7.2 Mbps download rate.
• Class C; for SD video service; 2 Mbps download rate.
We investigate CP’s end users’ choices of service classes
based on different PED. We show how users behavior under
the different PED; 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 or 2 affects the equilib-
rium price of each class the ISP charges the CP for delivering
its content.
As discussed above, we assume that the CPwill transfer the
price increase to their customers at the same rate (if the CP
absorbs some of the increase in prices, then this may represent
a different PED). As a benchmark, we consider users to be
distributed among classes according to the Cisco forecast
report [45], where UHD, HD, and SD users distribution are
19%, 56% and 25% respectively. We consider 1.8 million
users active simultaneously in the network. This figure is
obtained as follows: The number of users is 44 million users
in Netflix in the US and the average user spent around 1 hour
per day watching movies in 2015 [46]. Therefore, the average
number of users during one hour of the day is 1.8 million
users, which is an average number that does not consider
the popularity of different viewing times in the day. The
concentration of users at any node in AT&T network is based
on the population of the state where the node is located
(see Fig. 2).
FIGURE 2. AT&T core network with percentage of population in each
node.
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FIGURE 3. Price per Gbps per month and the corresponding number of users in each class based on different PED after repealing net neutrality
(cloud-based delivery).
FIGURE 4. Total profit per month of profit-driven model under different
PED scenarios for cloud-based delivery.
We consider the BT network connectivity selling price as
the net neutrality price of the three classes where 10 Gbps
connectivity is priced at £12,600 ($15,750) per year [47], i.e.
$131 per 1 Gbps link per month. The actual cost of provision-
ing ISP core network infrastructure is sensitive information
and not usually shared by ISPs. However, we estimate the
cost of provisioning 1 Gbps of network as $118 considering
10% as the ISP profit margin (the average profit margin
for AT&T [2] and Comcast [48] were approximately 9%
and 12%, respectively between 2013-2018). We divided the
cost among the three network layers; core, metro and access
network based on their power consumption percentages:
24%, 6% and 70%, respectively [49] which corresponds to
FIGURE 5. Total core network traffic and power consumption of
profit-driven model under different PED scenarios for cloud-based
delivery.
$28, $7, $83, respectively. The cost of $28 per Gbps in the
core network is associated with a single hop. For the AT&T
architecture the average hop count between clouds and other
nodes is 1. Note that, the access networks can use any technol-
ogy including technologies supporting mobility (LTE, 5G).
As shown in Fig. 2, we choose AT&T core network (a pri-
mary core network topology in the US) as a core network
topology example. This core network consists of 25 nodes
and 54 bidirectional links. AT&T hosts datacenters in
nodes 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 25 [50]. These
nodes are used to host datacenters to serve distributed CPs
users. The input parameters used are given in Table 1.
In the following subsections, we evaluate two scenarios;
equal PED for all classes and different PED for different
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FIGURE 6. Price per Gbps per month and the corresponding number of users in each class based on different PED after repealing net neutrality (cloud-fog
based delivery).
FIGURE 7. Total profit per month of profit-driven model under different
PED (cloud-fog based delivery).
classes. Under each scenario we study three scenarios of
delivering CPs contents to users; a cloud-based delivery and
a cloud-fog based deliver and fog-based delivery.
A. EQUAL PED AMONG CLASSES
In the following, we study three scenarios of delivering
CPs contents to users: cloud-based delivery, cloud-fog based
delivery and fog-based delivery.
1) CLOUD BASED DELIVERY
Figs. 3 to 5 show the profit-driven model results for
AT&T core network where content is delivered from the
FIGURE 8. Total core network power consumption and traffic of profit-
driven model under different PED (cloud-fog based delivery).
12 datacenters in the AT&T topology [50]. The number of
users and the corresponding price of each class under differ-
ent PED are illustrated in Fig. 3. The primary y-axis shows
price per Gbps per month of each class in US dollar. These
prices represent the equilibrium point of users’ willingness to
follow the price increase which results in maximum profit for
the ISP. The secondary y-axis corresponds to the percentage
of users subscribed to each class. The x-axis shows different
PED scenarios from 2 to 0.2. The former represents the
highest sensitivity to the price change considered, whereas,
the latter represents the contrary. PED values are shown along
with the case of net neutrality where the price of different
classes is fixed at $113 and the percentage of users in each
class follows Cisco forecast report [45] as discussed above.
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FIGURE 9. Price per Gbps per month and the corresponding number of users in each class based on different PED after repealing net neutrality
(fog-based delivery).
For each PED value we consider two cases; a case where
the optimized pricing scheme should maintain 100% of the
users that existed under net neutrality (LB ≥ 100) and another
case where the pricing scheme can result in users leaving the
service (LB≥ 0).
Fig. 4 is a plot of the monthly profit of ISP considering
different PED values as well as net neutrality scenario. Total
traffic of core network and the power consumption due to
this traffic under different PED scenarios and the net neu-
trality scenario are plotted in Fig. 5. In case of content with
PED = 2, under LB ≥ 100 or LB ≥ 0, Fig. 3 shows
that repealing net neutrality has increased class C users to
48% of the total number of users compared to 14% only
under the net neutrality pricing scheme. This increase is a
result of some users of class B downgrading to class C as
the class B price increased slightly by 18% (the number of
users in class B reduced to 36%) and due to new users joining
the service (the total number of users increased to 102%)
attracted by the 1% decrease in class C price. The users of
class A are reduced to 18% of the total number of users as
a result of the slight increase in price by 19%. This pricing
scheme and distribution of users have resulted in an increase
in the total profit by 54% compared to the net neutrality
scenario as seen in Fig. 4. For a less sensitive content with
PED = 0.2 under LB ≥ 0, the equilibrium pricing scheme
resulted in 28% of the users leaving the service as the increase
in the classes price resulted in an increase in the profit by a
factor of 8 (800%) compared to the net neutrality scenario.
Maintaining all the users of the service (LB ≥ 100) has
slightly reduced the profit by 10%.
In addition to growing ISP profit, the proposed pricing
scheme has resulted also in reducing the traffic volume in the
network. We observe in Fig. 5 a decline in the core network
traffic by up to 55% under PED = 0.2, LB ≥ 0 and a
consequent reduction in power consumption by 49%. This
reduction in core network traffic and power consumption
occurred for two reasons; 1) some cloud service users leave
classes A and B to subscribe to class C as the charges per
Gb/s of the classes A and B increase. 2) the total cloud service
subscribers diminished due to the increase in class C price (in
case of LB ≥ 0).
2) CLOUD-FOG BASED DELIVERY
Next, we introduce 10 fog nodes in addition to the 12 dat-
acenter locations. These fog nodes are assumed to be built
in the proximity of nodes with the highest population in the
AT&T core network, so no core network cost (C·) is incurred
by serving the demands of these nodes. Fig. 6 shows that the
prices per Gbps per month under different PED are less than
the previous case (cloud-based delivery) as we reduced the
cost of the core network by introducing the fog nodes. Under
PED = 2, the prices compared to the net neutrality case
in class A and B increased by 12% and 11%, respectively,
while the price of class C dropped by 1% as opposed to
19%, 18% and 1% with cloud-based delivery. The reduced
prices attracted more users resulting in increase in the profit
by 18% compared to the net neutrality case as seen in Fig. 7 as
opposed to a 54% increase in profit with cloud-based delivery.
Fig. 8 shows a reduction in core network traffic (40%) and
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FIGURE 10. Total profit per month of profit-driven model under different
PED (fog-based delivery).
FIGURE 11. Price per Gbps per month and the corresponding number of
users in each class of profit-driven model for different CP delivery
scenarios where PED values of different classes A, B and C are 2, 0.8 and
0.2, respectively.
power consumption (35%) by repealing net neutrality in the
cloud-fog architecture.
3) FOG BASED DELIVERY
Here, we consider a scenario in which all users access CP
contents from a local fog node. Although deploying a fog
node locally, to serve CP customers, increases the capital
expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expenses (OPEX) of
provisioning multiple locations (i.e. 25 fog nodes in AT&T
network), it reduces the communication network transit cost
burden to the minimum. However, fog nodes are not always
an option due to the finite capacity of processing and storage.
The results show that the prices are further reduced under
FIGURE 12. Total profit per month of profit-driven model for different CP
delivery scenarios where PED values of different classes A, B and C are 2,
0.8 and 0.2, respectively.
FIGURE 13. Total traffic resulting from profit-driven model for different
CP delivery scenarios where PED values of different classes A, B and C
are 2, 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.
fog-based delivery (Fig. 9) as no core network cost (C·) is
incurred by serving demands. For instance, under PED = 2,
the prices compared to the net neutrality case in class A and
B increased by 9% while the price of class C is decreased by
11% resulting in increase in the profit by 6% compared to the
net neutrality scenario as seen in Fig. 10.
B. DIFFERENT PED AMONG CLASSES
In this section, we consider a scenario where elasticity of
demand varies among the different classes of service.We con-
sider class C to be less sensitive to price change than class
B. Also, we considered class B to be less sensitive than
class A. The elasticity of demand for classes A, B and C are
considered to be 2, 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. Fig. 11 shows
the price per Gbps for classes A and B is the same under
different scenarios and delivery schemes as a result of the high
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FIGURE 14. Total core network power consumption resulting from
profit-driven model for different CP delivery scenarios where PED values
of different classes A, B and C are 2, 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.
PED of class A. Class C is priced at the same level of classes
A and B for LB ≥ 0 as the low PED of class C limits the
number of users leaving the services as a result of increase in
the price. Fig. 12 shows an increase in profit by up to 88%,
29% and 16% under cloud-based delivery, cloud-fog based
delivery and fog-based delivery, respectively, compared to
the net neutrality scenario. Fig 13 shows a decrease in core
network traffic by up to 43% and 30% under cloud-based
delivery and cloud-fog based delivery, respectively, compared
to the net neutrality scenario. Also, the total reduction in the
core network power consumption (as shown in Fig 14) is up
to 40% and 32% under cloud-based delivery and cloud-fog
based delivery respectively.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a MILP model to optimize the
pricing scheme used by ISPs to charge CPs for delivering
their video content under the repeal of net neutrality where
ISPs can treat data intensive traffic less favorably. A techno-
economic Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model
is developed to maximize the ISP profit by optimizing the
ISP pricing scheme to charge different classes of service
differently subject to PED. We considered three classes of
service that represent different data rate requirements of video
content. The analysis addressed three CP delivery scenarios;
cloud-based delivery, cloud-fog based delivery and fog-based
delivery. The results show that the discriminatory pricing
scheme can increase the ISPs profit by a factor of 8. The
results also show that by influencing the way end-users con-
sume data-intensive content, the core network traffic and
consequently power consumption are reduced by up to 49%
and 55%, respectively, compared to the net neutrality sce-
nario. In this work we consider a monopoly ISP provider. The
competition between ISPs and its effect on pricing and the
dynamics of users will be considered in future work where
multiple ISPs exist hence affecting pricing and the dynamics
of users. The problem of the competitive ISP market can be
mathematically solved by game theory, where the strategic
interaction between rational decision-makers is considered.
In game theory, each ISP chooses the best decision taking
into account the decisions of other ISPs’.
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